1. The Australia Group (AG), Comprising 42 Countries and the EUROPEAN Union, Met for the 37th Australia Group Plenary in Paris from 3 to 7 June 2024.
2. The ag aims to entSure that trade in Sensitive Dual-Use Goods and Technology Does Not Contribute to the Production Or ProlFration of CHEMICAL OF Al weapons (CBW), and that leggil trade is facilities. This is the achieved through the harmonyothing and coordination ofExport Controls Through Best Practices, Information Sharing, Outreach and Public Awareness Raising. T measures reflecting its agmitments, and in accountance with each partipant's sovereign right to determine prolifes for themslves.
3. The Ag's Effectiveness is Based on a Shared Commission to Country-ProLiferation Objectives and The Stringth of EACH PARTIPANT's Nations. AMework. It is Also Based on the Transparency of the Ag Common Control List and the Ag's Approach to the Inclusion, Modification orRemoval of items on theSe ListsIndore Stock. This information is publicly available for use by both Ag PARTIPANTS and Non-PARTICIPANTS.
4. AG PARTIPIPANTARTE Committed to Expanding Trade in Chemical and Biology items for Peaceful Purpose ICAL Industries. AG ACTIVITIES Do Not Hinder LegitImate Trade Involving Chemicals, Biology Agents and Related Dual-Use its and equipmentHyderabad Stocks. Intead, T, T HE AGHelps Increase the awareness, confidence, trust and assurance NextASARY to facilities the trade of the purpose for peaceful uses.
5. PARTIPIPANTS Reaffirmed their Commission to Streangthening CBW-Related Count-Proliferation Efforts And Reservetical Ny Time, by Anyone, Under Any Circumstances Is Unacceptable and Prohibited Under International Law.
6. PARTICIPANTS Reaffirmed the Vital Role of the Ag in Maintation and Enhancing International Peace and Security and Countering The Threat of the ProLiferation of CBW S.The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and the Wassenaar Arrangement. Streangthened Global Security is vital at a time when some non-nationals Continue to seek to access, developed or used weapons of mass desrification (WMD) Capabilities.
7. PARTIPIPANTS Urged All Countries to Respect Fully Their Obligations Under International Law Not to Develop, Produce or Use Chemical Weapons. PARTICIPAN. TS UNDERSCORD Their Contining Strong and UNEquivocal Support for the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Wea Pons (Pons (OPCW) As CornerStones of DisarMament and the Elimination of Chemical Weapons. Participants Expressed and Reachmed SUPPPORT and Appreciation for the OPCW's PROFES Sionalism, Impartiality and Integrity and Its Role Investigating and Attributing Chemical Weapons Use.
8. PARTIPIPANTS NOTED PROGRESS MADE SINCE The FIFTH CWC Review Conference in May 2023. Participants Continue to work at the OPCW to Advance its Work, Such As Investigating and Attributing Chemical Weapons Use, Including in Syria, And Fortification the OPCW Governance Structure.
9. PARTICIPANTS Recalled Instance of Chemical Weapons Use Over The Past Decade, Including in Syria. In Discussion on the Decision [C-28/DEC.12] Adopted AT HE CWC Conference of the States Parties in November 2023, Participants Discussed the Importance ofProgressing the iMplementation of Measures to Prohibit and Prevent the Transfer of Toxic Chemicals to Syria. Participants Note in February 2024 of the F The F OURTH OPCW Investigation and Identification Team's (IT) Report Into Chemical Weapon Use in Syria. They Re-EMPHASISED that the userOf Chemical Weapons by States or Non-State Actors is not acceptable under any circumstances. PARTICIPANTS Uria to Fully The Opcw TECHNICA l secretaria.
10. PARTIPIPANTS CONTINUED to Express Concess Regarding The USE of Chemical Warfare Against Individuals. PARTICIPANTS Recalled with Sadness The Deth of Russ IAN Opposition Figure Alexei Navalny in February 2024. They Noted His Passing Heightened The Focus on the CircumstanceS Around His Poisoning UNOVICHOK NER VEAgent in August 2020. They recalled the use of a no no no no no no nophochok nerve agent in salisbury, united kingdom in 2018, and the deth of dawn sturges POSED to a novichok agent in amesbury. PARTICIPANTS Also Recalled the DEATH of Kim Jong-NAM in 2017 Who WAS POISNED with a Nerve Agent.
11. PARTIPIPANTS DISCUSSED Concerns About CBW PROLiferation Activities in a Number of Countries Including IRAN, NORTH KOREA and Syria.
12. Participants Expressed their Concess that the Mandate of the Panel of Experts of the 1718 Committee of the United National Council (UNSC) WAS NOT Ed Becaue of a Veto by Russia as a Permanent Member of the UNSC.And assistance in Response to North Korea's WMD Program Including CBW.
13. Participants Agreed on the Importance of Taking ApproPriance Action to Ensure All Who Use Chemical Weapons, or Those Who Command, Enable or Shield Those Who US E Chemical Weapons, Are Held to Account.
14. PARTICIPANTS UNDERSCORD TheIR Contining Strong and UNEQUIVOCAL Support for the Biology and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). Ontinued SUPPORT for And Welcomed Progress Made in The Recently Formed BWC Working Group Towards Streangthening The Convention. hairOf the working group, H.E. Ambassador Flávio SOARES DAMICO, on the Group's Work. PARTICIPANTS looked to the dueopopopment of two New Mechanisms, One On Ternational Cooperation and Assistance and One on Scientific and Technological Developments, And Constructure Progress on the Other ITEMS on theAgenda of the working group, including promoting transparency, enhancing image after biosecurity measures, and compliance and verification.
15. Recalling Un General Assembly Resolution A/Res/ES-11/6, Which DEPLORED The DIRE CONSEQUENCES of The Aggression by the Russian Federation Against Ukraine, PARTI CIPANTS Strongly Condemned the Threat by Russia to use Chemical and Biology Weapons and Attacks at and inThe Vicinity of Civil Biology and Chemical Facilities in Ukraine. PARTICIPANTS NOTED The OPCW Statement On 7 MAY SAID SATTUD THE SITUATION In AINE Remains Volatile and Extremely Concessing Regarding The Possible Re-Emergeence of Use of Toxic Chemicals As Weapons.TO TIGHTEN Controls on Exports of Sensitive Dual-Use Goods and Technologies in this Regard, Mentioned Some National RESTRICTIVE MEASUSURES and Explored Ways To Fu Fu Fu RTHER Coordinal Activities in Furtherance of Non-ProLiferation Objects. PARTICIPANTS Strongly Condemned Russia's Unsubstantiated Claims About Chemical And Biology Weapons, IncludingClaims Against Ukraine and the United States, Both Ag PARTICIPANTS.
16. PARTIPANTS RECOGNISED The ONGOING Threat of Chemical and Biology Terrorism and the Need TO Remain Vigilant to Procurement THAT COULD SUCH Activ iTies, and to Guard Against the Misuse of Chemical and Biology Technologies and Equipment by Non-State Actors.
17. PARTIPANTS RECALLED TheIR Support for UNSC Resolution 1540, and ites subsequent resolutions, in countical projects from non-state attories, Includin G for Terrorist Purposes, and Welcomed The Extension of ITS MANDATE. They Recognned the Important Work of the 1540 Commitee and Groupof experts. They Welcomed the Recent Appointment of New Experts and looked to Productive Capacity-Building Events to Support UNSC RESOLUTION 1540 Entation.
18. PARTIPIPANTS WELCOMED The VALUABLE Work Work of Other non-process EStruction and the International PARTNERSHIP AGainst IMPUNITITY for The USE of Chemical Weapons.The International SSEM to Combat the Proliferation of WMD, Including Through Exchange Information, Coordining Action, and Delivering Capacity-Building Assistance T O Prevent, Detect and Respond to Chemical and Biology Warfare Threats.
19. AG licensing and enforcement experts exchanged experiences, case studies and best practices to prevent the proliferation of sensitive dual-use chemicals, biological materials and related equipment and technology. The discussion highlighted the value of sharing challenges, learnings, and enhancements of the exportControls Enforcement Community. The Importance of Effective Intangible Technology Transfer (ITT) Controls and Focusing NTWORKS WAS ALSO DISCU Ssed. Participants Agreed on the Importation of the Ag's No-Undercut Policy and Denials Processs in Preventing CBW ProlFition.
? For non-partiferation and export control. PARTICIPANTS DISCUSSED DUAL-Use Research of Concern, Advances in Synthetic Chemistry, DNA Synthesis, ArtifilityIntelligence and automation.
21. NOTING The AG's Common Control List Serve as a Benchmark for Global Best Practice, Participants Continued Their Works Applied to the Chemical A ND Biology items on the lists. This included updates to the agmon control lists in response to emerging.Participants Updated the Factors for Consideration (FFC) for Assession the Inclusion, Modification, or Removal of items on the agmon Control Lists, To Ensure Hat The lists relevant, APROPRIATE and ENFORCEABLE, and ABLE to Adapt to emerging agents, precursors, equipmentAnd technologies that enable CBW Development and Use.
22. Updated Common Control Lists, A Description of the FFCS and the Ag Guidelines are available at
23. Participants agreed to Continue An Active Program of Outreach to, and Engagement with, Non-PARTICIPANTS, Including Those Which Incorporate Ag Controls Into Heir National Export Control Frameworks, to Promote the Value and Role of the ag.CBW proliferation and raise awareness of the positive contribution of the AG to international peace and security, Participants agreed to continue to engage other international institutions, academia and industry. Participants noted the importance of such outreach to facilitate the wider adoption of AG Common Control Lists andPractices, and and And PARTIPIPATION in the Ag. Participants Welcomed the Outreach from the Ag Chair and Secretariat, Including at the Asian Export Control Seminar I n tokyo in FeBruary 2024, as well as the oppooths to interact with themINTESSSIONAL Meeting in Berlin in January 2024.
24. At the invitational of the Secretariat, Guest Speakers Addressed the Plenary. PARTICIPANTS THANIDED The United National ON DRUGS and Crime For its presentation On the International Legal Framework Against Chemical and Biology Terrorism and the EUROPEAN Export Control Association for Researchs For its onOn item classification in a research settingKanpur Stock. Participants Also ThanKed Interpol for Presenting On the Evolving Threat LandsCape Relates and Explosive s.
25. PARTIPIPANTS AFFIRMED the Importance of the Group ’s DIVERSE MEMBERSHIP. PARTICIPANTS WELCOMED and Potential Future Member Applications and dertook to Engage with Interest Applicants FURTHER.
26. Participants Reaffirmed their Commitable to Encouraging Declarations of Adherence and the Importance of Adoption of Ag Guidelines and Common Control List S MAN Y countries as possible, including countries with development expontrol meeting, key transport and transhipment hubs. EThe Information From Exchanges With the Ag Chair and Participants to Assist the Implementing Global Best Practure in Chemical and Biology Export Controls.
27. Participants lookd forward to furnher engine with countries portally interest in unilateral adhesce.
28. Participants ThanKed France for its hosting of the 2024 Ag Plenary Meeting in Paris. PARTICIPANTS UNDERSCORD The Importance of the Ag Plenary ATE The 40th Anniversary of the Ag and the Ag's Lengthy Contribution to Country CBW ProLiferation. PARTICIPANTS NOTED that 2025Will Also Mark the 50th Anniversary of the Entry INTO Force of the BWC, and the 100th Anniversary of the Signing of the Geneva Protocol (for the Prohibition of the. USE in War of Asphyxiaating, Poisonous or Other Games, and of Bacteriology Methods of Warfare)Then, then
29. PARTIPIPANTS Thanked Germany for its hosting of the agency meting in Berlin from 29 January to 2 February 2024. G ofRessional Meeting, Which Will Be Held in Bucharest on 29 to 31 January 2025. PARTICIPANTS ReitatedThe value of meting intersections, as an important oppointunity, ICAL Information, and Conduct Outreach.
30. FURTHER Information On the Australia Group is available at
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